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Article 
 
Logic of Identity and  
Identity of Contradiction 
 
Rudi Capra 
 
 
Abstract: Western philosophy has mainly developed in accordance 
with the three laws of identity, noncontradiction and excluded middle, 
also known as “laws of thought”. Since Zen Buddhism often violates 
these apparently indisputable logical principles, a superficial reading 
may induce the idea that Zen Buddhism is a completely irrational, 
illogical doctrine. In this essay, I argue that Zen Buddhism is not 
absurd or illogical. Conversely, it relies on a different logic, which is 
perfectly consonant with the Buddhist view of the world. 
 
Keywords: Zen, logic, identity, contradiction 
 
 
n the one hand, philosophical discourse in the West has mainly 
developed in accordance to the fundamental axioms known as “laws 
of thought,” whose earliest explicit formulation (even if not 
systematically organized) appeared in the Platonic-Aristotelian corpus. These 
rules are the law of identity, the law of noncontradiction, and the law of excluded 
middle. In Classical philosophy and logic, these principles were 
conventionally credited with underlying any valid thought process. 
It has been pointed out, on the other hand, that the tradition of Zen 
Buddhism systematically violated these apparently self-evident axioms, 
resulting in anti-logical or a-logical conclusions which were frequently 
judged (especially by Western readers) as paradoxical, or even nonsensical. 
Thus, Zen Buddhism is often regarded as a cult of the absurd for its emphasis 
on the narrowness of the ordinary mind (limited by logical constraints) in 
respect to the openness of the state of “pure mind” or “no mind.”  
In this essay, I argue that Zen Buddhism, far from being a cult of the 
absurd, is only apparently nonsensical and irrational. In order to do that, I first 
expound, in detail, the three laws of thought as they were conceived in the 
original Platonic-Aristotelian corpus. Successively, I explain why these 
principles are openly rejected in the Buddhist view. Lastly, I argue that Zen 
O 
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is not plainly illogical, but rather relies on a different logic that cannot merely 
be dismissed as absurd. 
 
The Three Laws of Thought 
 
George Boole (1854) was the first to define the principles of identity, 
noncontradiction, and excluded middle as “laws of thought” in his second 
monograph on algebraic logic. However, the implicit adoption and repeated 
application of these laws in the construction of logical and philosophical 
(even ontological) theories has been central throughout the history of Western 
thought. In fact, their earliest known formulation dates back to the Classical 
age of ancient Greece.  
In the context of Greek philosophy, there is a relationship of 
conceptual filiation between Parmenides, Plato, and Aristotle, expressly 
revealed by Plato, who refers to the older writer as “father Parmenides” 
(πατρὸς Παρμενίδου).1 In fact, Parmenides was the first to theorize, in his 
philosophical poem On Nature, the mutual exclusivity of “What-is” and 
“What-is-not,” establishing then, and once for all, a(n) (onto)logical notion of 
identity as an irreducible, fundamental feature of What-is, being necessarily 
identical to itself, and necessarily different from What-is-not.2  
This achievement was not at all banal, nor undisputed, since before 
Parmenides, another influential philosopher, Heraclitus, in a homonymous 
philosophical treatise, had described the universe (kosmos) as a dynamic flux 
in which all identities, despite being apparently unchangeable and opposite, 
are actually complementary components of the cosmic unity. 
Unsurprisingly, both Heraclitus’ and Parmenides’ positions are 
briefly compared in Plato’s Theaetetus where the law of identity (hereafter 
referred to as LID) is first formulated. In the text, Socrates mediates between 
the Heraclitean doctrine of flux and the Parmenidean doctrine of 
motionlessness, suggesting that Parmenides, despite his obscurity, seems 
worthy of reverence or veneration (αἰδοῖος). Then, even if roughly exposed, 
a basic concept of identity, and ipso facto a basic concept of difference (that is, 
non-identity), are undoubtedly present in this dialogue: 
 
Socrates: Now take a sound and a color. First of all, don’t 
you think this same thing about both of them, that they 
both are? 
Theaetetus: I do. 
                                                 
1 Plato, Sophist, trans. by Nicholas P. White, in Plato: Complete Works, ed. by John M. 
Cooper and Douglas S. Hutchinson (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1997), 241d. 
2 Parmenides, On Nature (fragments), in Hermann Diels and Walther Kranz, Die 
Fragmente der Vorsokratiker (Berlin: Weidmann, 1974), fragments 2-3.  
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Socrates: Also that each of them is different from the 
other and the same as itself?  
Theaetetus: Of course. 
Socrates: And that both together are two, and each of 
them is one? 
Theaetetus: Yes, I think that too. 3 
 
The logical form of the LID can then be expressed by the logical 
notation A=A, meaning that any conceivable considered entity is necessarily 
identical to itself. The LID, even if not explicitly formulated there, is 
repeatedly employed in Aristotle’s works, for instance when he attempts to 
demonstrate the validity of the second of these laws, the law of 
noncontradiction, which is nonetheless ultimately dependent upon (and 
necessarily implied by) the LID.4 
The law of noncontradiction (hereafter described as LNC), which had 
again been implicitly accepted by Parmenides, and openly rejected by 
Heraclitus, was implicitly present in several Platonic dialogues. Plato also 
explicitly formulated the principle in the Republic: 
 
The same thing clearly cannot act or be acted upon in the 
same part or in relation to the same thing at the same 
time, in contrary ways.5 
 
In several passages of the Metaphysics, Aristotle formulates the LNC 
in a logical and ontological form: 
 
It is impossible that the same thing belong and not 
belong to the same thing at the same time and in the 
same respect.6 
 
The most certain of all basic principles is that 
contradictory propositions are not true simultaneously.7 
 
In logical notation, the LNC could be expressed as ~(A∧~A). In 
Aristotle’s view it was “the most certain [βεβαιοτάτη] of all principles.”8  
                                                 
3 Plato, Theaetetus, trans. by M.J. Levett, rev. by Myles Burnyeat, in Plato: Complete 
Works, 185ab. 
4 Aristotle, Metaphysics, trans. by Hugh Tredennick (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1933), 1004b. 
5 Plato, Republic, G.M.A. Grube, rev. by C.D.C. Reeve, in Plato: Complete Works, 436b. 
6 Aristotle, Metaphysics, 1005b19-20. 
7 Ibid, 1011b13-14. 
8 Ibid, 1005b24. 
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Avicenna was slightly more explicit, claiming that  
 
Anyone who denies the law of noncontradiction should 
be beaten and burned until he admits that to be beaten is 
not the same as not to be beaten, and to be burned is not 
the same as not to be burned.9 
 
Indeed, if the LID is accepted in the first place, the LNC cannot but 
follow as a direct implication. In fact, once the idea of a specific irreducible 
identity is posed, that same identity cannot but reveal its manifest specificity 
and irreducibility in respect to all other conceivable entities. In other words, 
any contingent identity of an entity to itself directly implies the idea of 
difference of the same entity in respect to any other entity; it does naturally 
follow that identity and difference, in respect to the same entity, are mutually 
exclusive, and therefore, contradictory. 
In a similar way, the third of these laws, the law of the excluded 
middle (from now on referred to as LEM) is nothing but a direct consequence 
of the first two assumptions. Once the notions of identity, and 
contradictoriness are given as premises, it is clear that any true proposition 
entails a false negation, and vice versa. As Aristotle puts it, “it will not be 
possible to be and not to be the same thing.”10 Therefore, the possibility of a 
third term (the aforementioned “middle”) is to be excluded (tertium non 
datur). Or, again in Aristotle’s words,  
 
there cannot be an intermediate between contradictories, 
but of one subject we must either affirm or deny any one 
predicate.11 
 
The combined set of LID, LNC, and LEM has never been questioned 
in the domain of formal logic until the early 20th century, when modern 
developments and ideas led to the formulation of revolutionary forms of 
logic, such as intuitionistic logic.  
However, it is important to note that these principles did not remain 
enclosed in the narrow field of formal logic. They have been, instead almost 
unconditionally endorsed within traditional ontological, metaphysical, and 
even scientific theoretical speculations, following the path traced by Father 
Parmenides who first theorized the triadic proximity of Being (εἶναι), 
Thought (νοεῖν), and Discourse (λέγειν), a conceptual configuration which 
                                                 
9 Avicenna, The Metaphysics of The Healing, trans. by Michael E. Marmura (Provo: 
Brigham Young University Press, 2005), I.11.105a4–5. 
10 Aristotle, Metaphysics, 1004ab. 
11 Ibid, 1007a. 
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has exercised a remarkable influence on the historical development of 
Western philosophy.12 
In fact, without the adoption of these principles there could have 
been neither substance (οὐσία), nor essence (τὸ τί), neither object 
(ἀντικείμενον), nor subject (ὐποκείμενον), nor would the conception of the 
Cartesian ego have been possible.  
It is precisely the irrefutable status of the logic of identity (and its 
implications) in its logical, ontological, psychological usage that has been 
harshly and repeatedly targeted by the modern and contemporary maîtres du 
soupçon: Nietzsche, Freud, Derrida, and Deleuze.13 Whereas the Western 
philosophical tradition mainly developed as a patient construction of majestic 
theoretical architectures starting from a few solid conceptual grounds, these 
aforementioned philosophers advocated for a gradual dismantlement of 
those grounds that, in the meanwhile, had become impenetrable walls, 
insurmountable limits of thought.  
In particular, the general acceptance of the above-described laws led 
to labelling as absurd, irrational, “poetic” or laughable all theories and 
philosophical views that would totally or partially reject them.14 In the next 
section, I will briefly expose some fundamental traits of the Buddhist 
worldview, and illustrate how, without falling into an abyss of nonsense, this 
view does not offer any ground for endorsing the Western laws of thought. 
 
The Buddhist View 
 
The fundamental truths of Buddhism seem to have been derived 
from the simple observation of the natural world. The famous story of the 
earliest trips of Gautama Buddha out of his palace, when he saw for the first 
time an old man, a diseased man, and a rotting corpse, regardless of its 
historical truthfulness, represents a symbolic invitation to any individual—
an invitation to observe the natural course of the world and consider the 
                                                 
12 On the centrality of the principle of identity and of Parmenides’ influence in respect 
to the historical development of Western philosophy, see Martin Heidegger, Zur Sache des 
Denkens (Tübingen: Niemeyer) or Martin Heidegger, On Time and Being, trans. by J. Stambaugh 
(New York: Harper & Row, 1972). 
13 In relation to the present issue, see Friedrich Nietzsche, Kritische Studienausgabe 
(Berlin: de Gruyter, 1999), 9, 11[7]; Sigmund Freud, “The Origin and Development of 
Psychoanalysis”, trans. by Harry W. Chase, in The American Journal of Psychology 21:2 (1910), 181–
218; and Gilles Deleuze, Différence et Répétition (Paris: PUF, 1968). 
14 Besides the aforementioned criticisms of Zen, it is worth remembering Carnap’s 
renowned and merciless comment of a passage from Heidegger’s Being and Time, or Bertrand 
Russell’s petty comments on Nietzsche’s philosophy (and on Nietzsche himself), certainly 
excusable given his poor understanding of the subject. 
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evidence that all is impermanent and “whatever is subject to origination is 
subject to cessation.”15  
The universe is then compared to a “decaying old house on fire,” and 
the mission of the Buddha is “to rescue sentient beings from the fire of birth, 
old age, illness and death, anxiety, sorrow, suffering, distress, delusion, 
blindness, and the three poisons of greed, hatred, and ignorance.”16 
In Buddhism, the notion of impermanence (anicca) is one of the three 
marks of existence, the others being unsatisfactoriness (dukkha) and no-
selfness (anatta). Leaving aside for the moment the existential implications of 
the affliction (dukkha) caused by the unsatisfying, unreliable nature of things, 
I will analyze the mutually dependent concepts of impermanence, and of the 
absence of intrinsic nature, with peculiar attention to the former because it 
seems to hold an axiomatic position in the (historical and hermeneutic) 
development of Buddhism. By definition, an axiom is a principle that is 
accepted to be true by self-evidence, and as I previously claimed, the self-
evidence of impermanence is seized from the simple observation of the 
world. However, an axiom is also a fundamentally undisputed premise on 
which further arguments can be based.  
From this point of view, not only the reality of impermanence is 
uncontested among all Buddhist schools (whereas other doctrinal elements 
tend to vary, sometimes greatly), but even among the three marks it seems to 
retain at least a logical priority. Indeed, the unsatisfactoriness caused by the 
unreliable nature of things does not necessarily imply that the nature of 
things is truly unreliable. At the same time, the selflessness of things (and 
beings) does not necessarily imply that all forms of existence are conditioned 
phenomena, constantly immersed in a lingering state of transience.  
On the contrary, the notion of anicca is clearly incompatible with an 
essentialist view, and therefore directly implies anatta (but apparently not 
dukkha). In sum, the concept of impermanence has to be considered a 
fundamental axiom of the Buddhist discourse, because of its irrefutable status 
and its logical priority over the following doctrinal elaborations. 
Since everything is impermanent and devoid of intrinsic nature, in 
order to describe the universe, Buddhist texts often employ the concept of 
śūnyatā (“voidness,” “emptiness,” “nothingness,” “openness”).  
In the Lotus Sutra, the nature of the world is presented thus: 
 
All dharmas are empty and without substance, 
                                                 
15 The Middle Length Discourses of the Buddha: A Translation of the Majjhima Nikaya (The 
Teachings of the Buddha), trans.  by Bhikku Nanamoli and Bhikku Bodhi (Soomerville: Wisdom, 
1995), 56. 
16 The Lotus Sutra, trans. by Tsugunari Kubo and Akira Yuyama (Berkeley: Numata 
Center for Buddhist Translation and Research, 2007), 13a. 
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Impermanent, without origination or cessation. 
This is known as the sphere 
Of the relationships of the wise. 
Through the error of discrimination 
One sees all existent things 
As existing or nonexisting, 
Real or unreal, 
Produced or unproduced. 
[…] 
He [the bodhisattva] should regard all dharmas 
As being without substance, 
Like empty space 
Which has no firmness. 
All dharmas are neither produced 
Nor do they emerge; 
They are immovable, nonreturning, 
And always remain in their single character. 
This is known as the sphere of relationships.17 
 
The first passage is particularly critical of the deceptive effect of the 
discriminating mind, which operates by applying on reality illusory 
dichotomies (of existing/nonexisting, real/unreal, produced/unproduced). In 
fact, since the universe is a constant flux in which all aggregates are gradually 
dissolved while new ones gradually emerge, any perceivable distinction is 
ultimately relative. Also, anything that is, and ceases to be, is neither created 
ex nihilo nor extinct in nihilo. If nothing is generated and nothing is destroyed 
within the universal law of impermanence, then, in a wider sense, all 
dharmas, perpetually in motion, are “immovable,” since they “always remain 
in their single character.” Furthermore, the reality of dharmas is explicitly 
compared to an “empty space which has no firmness,” and is “without 
substance.” 
The Diamond Sutra, whose poetic and imaginative style was greatly 
influential in the Zen tradition, contains the famous gatha: 
 
All conditioned dharmas  
Are like dreams, illusions, bubbles, shadows,  
Like dew drops and a lightning flash:  
Contemplate them thus.18 
                                                 
17 Ibid, 37c. 
18 The Diamond of Perfect Wisdom Sutra, trans. by the Chung Tai Translation Committee, 
in Bao Lin Chan Monastery – Zen Center of Melbourne, <http://chungtai.org.au/en/wp-
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The “conditioned dharmas” indicate all events and activities: 
empirical senses, mental processes, entities and forms, material elements. 
Everything in the universe is a conditioned dharma, and comparable to 
dreams, illusions, and shadows, phenomena which are real in a broad sense 
(since something is occurring) but unreal in the ordinary sense of the term 
(since what is truly occurring is different from what seems to occur).  
Conditioned dharmas are comparable to bubbles, dew drops, and 
lightning flashes, phenomena that arise as rapidly as they vanish. Once more, 
it is claimed that the “true nature of reality is empty. This is what the 
Tathagata calls the true nature of reality.”19  
Similarly, in the Vimalakīrti Nirdeśa Sūtra, we read, “All constructed 
things are impermanent.”20 And “nothing was ever destroyed, is destroyed, 
or will ever be destroyed. Such is the meaning of ‘impermanence.’”21 Even in 
this case, the notion of impermanence directly implies that all things and 
phenomena lack an inherent nature: “This world has the nature of 
voidness”.22  
It is important to note that the Buddhist void (śūnyatā) is by no means 
intended as the Parmenidean οὐκ ἔστιν, which is equivalent to the empty set 
of possible thoughts beyond the inherent limits of thinkability, which is 
equivalent to a formal representation of the paradoxical nature of what-is-
not. 23  
On the contrary, according to the Buddhist world view, śūnyatā is 
only apparently paradoxical. Instead it lies in the processual core of reality, 
constituting its veritable character: “Matter itself is void. Voidness does not 
result from the destruction of matter, but the nature of matter is itself 
voidness.”24  
Matter is void not because it is nonexistent, but in the sense that “that 
physical appearances are actually not physical appearances.”25 Physical 
appearances are ultimately subject to permutation and dissolution; they lack 
any sort of stable essence, τὸ τί, haecceity, irreducible ego or consciousness. 
Put briefly, all things are impermanent; all compounded things have no Self. 
                                                 
content/uploads/2015/02/Sutra-6-The-Diamond-of-Perfect-Wisdom-Sutra.pdf>. Hereafter cited 
as Diamond Sutra. 
19 Ibid, 14. 
20 The Holy Teaching of Vimalakirti: A Mahayana Scripture, trans. by Robert A.F. Thurman 
(University Park: Penn State Press, 2003), 1. Hereafter cited as Vimalakirti Sutra. 
21 Ibid, 3. 
22 Ibid, 9. 
23 Parmenides, On Nature, Fragment 8: οὐδὲ νοητόν ἔστιν ὅπως οὐκ ἔστι. 
24 Vimalakirti Sutra, 9. 
25 Diamond Sutra, 5. 
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Particularly, the critique of the idea of a stable intrinsic nature (svabhāva) finds 
its most brilliant (and explicit) philosophical formulation in the Madhyamaka 
school, whose founder Nāgārjuna is regarded by many as the hypothetical 
“unofficial First Patriarch” of Zen Buddhism. By systematically recurring to 
the prominent figure of Indian classical logic, the tetralemma, Nāgārjuna 
criticized all forms of essentialism. Specifically, he challenged the essentialist 
view of Abhidharma that had consistently grown in popularity among 
Buddhists disciples.26 
In Nāgārjuna’s corpus  
 
svabhāva is by definition the subject of contradictory 
ascriptions. If it exists, it must belong to an existent 
entity, which means that it must be conditioned, 
dependent on other entities, and caused. 
Nevertheless, svabhāva is by definition unconditioned, 
not dependent on other entities, and not caused. Thus 
the existence of svabhāva is impossible.27  
 
Since everything that exists is conditioned, depending upon a 
multiple set of causes and relationships, the absence of intrinsic nature is thus 
explicitly equated to the principle of pratītyasamutpāda. The term is 
translatable as “dependent origination,” “dependent arising,” 
“interdependent co-arising,” “conditioned arising,” “conditioned genesis,” 
“causal interdependence,” and more literally, “arising according to 
dependence upon causal conditions.” It is poetically exemplified by the 
metaphor of Indra’s net:  
 
Far away in the heavenly abode of the great god Indra, 
there is a wonderful net which has been hung by some 
cunning artificer in such a manner that it stretches out 
infinitely in all directions. In accordance with the 
extravagant tastes of deities, the artificer has hung a 
single glittering jewel in each eye of the net, and since 
the net itself is infinite in dimension, the jewels are 
infinite in number. There hang the jewels, glittering like 
stars in the first magnitude, a wonderful sight to behold. 
If we now arbitrarily select one of these jewels for 
inspection and look closely at it, we will discover that in 
                                                 
26 Even though in the earlier formulations of Abhidharma’s doctrine, “svabhāva” is 
employed as a criterion that determines what a dharma is, not necessarily that a dharma exists. 
27 Richard H. Robinson, “Some Logical Aspects of Nāgārjuna’s System” in Philosophy 
East & West, 6:4 (1957), 301-313. 
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its polished surface there are reflected all the other 
jewels in the net, infinite in number. Not only that, but 
each of the jewels reflected in this one jewel is also 
reflecting all the other jewels, so that there is an infinite 
reflecting process occurring.28 
 
A different interpretation of the Buddha’s teachings was offered by 
the Yogachara school, which was also very influential on the historical 
development of Zen. In respect to the Madhyamaka school, criticized for its 
“nihilistic” description of reality, Yogacarins stressed the idea that 
consciousness (vijñāna) is the only reality, and all phenomena only exist as 
appearances.29 According to this view, the entire system of mentation is 
naturally predisposed to accumulate and substantialize multiple perceptions, 
thus creating the illusion of a persistent self. 
In the Yogachara’s perspective, śūnyatā does not necessarily refer to 
physical phenomena. Instead, it represents the final dissolution of the limit 
that divides the subject and the object, causing the “awakening” (bodhi). 
Śūnyatā dwells in the consciousness – although consciousness is not regarded 
as a self-subsistent entity. Although Tibetan sources present the Yogachara 
and Madhyamaka as rival schools, modern scholars tend present these views 
as complementary interpretations.30  
However, the Buddhist Weltanschauung is grounded on the notion of 
impermanence (anicca), which implies (or coincides with) the absence of 
intrinsic nature (anatta). All aggregates arising and ceasing within this 
dynamic context of perpetual transformation are basically interconnected 
and mutually dependent on causal conditions (pratītyasamutpāda). Since all 
phenomena lack intrinsic nature, intrinsic reality, intrinsic identity, and 
intrinsic referentiality (svabhāva), the fundamental nature of phenomena is 
empty (śūnyatā). The spontaneous action of consciousness (vijñāna) tends to 
see them as if they were self-subsistent. 
What is important to note, is that the constitutive lack of “self” or 
“intrinsic nature” described by Buddhism unavoidably deprives of universal 
validity the application of those principles that served as a basis for the 
philosophical research in the West. According to the Buddhist view, any 
apparent object (or subject) is the result of several complex dynamic 
                                                 
28 Francis H. Cook, Hua-Yen Buddhism: The Jewel Net of Indra (University Park: Penn 
State Press, 1977), 7. 
29 Madhyamaka was deemed “nihilistic” by some Yogacharins since the exponent of 
the Madhyamaka school apparently posed the dharma “in the Void”. See for instance Dan 
Lusthaus, Buddhist Phenomenology: A Philosophical Investigation of Yogacara Buddhism and the Ch’eng 
Wei-shih Lun (London: Routledge, 2002). 
30 On this topic, see Edward Conze, A Short History of Buddhism, (London: Oneworld, 
1993). 
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interactions, exactly as a color is nothing but the result of the interaction of 
physical light receptors with the electromagnetic spectrum.  
Indeed, the interpenetration of all things, and their ultimate 
transitory nature prevent any attempt at individuating or defining a single, 
persistent identity, dependent neither on spatial nor temporal conditions for 
its own existence. In this sense, the LID obviously has to be rejected, together 
with its corollaries and implications. Any Buddhist philosopher would 
probably disagree with Parmenides on the mutual exclusiveness of 
contraries, and agree instead with the Heraclitean utterance that a man 
cannot step twice into the same river, since both the river, and the man are 
subject to the ever-changing flux of time. 
In the following paragraphs, I consider Zen Buddhism and its 
renowned use of paradoxical images and absurd statements. By exposing 
relevant notions concerning the nature of language and consciousness 
according to Zen, I illustrate a peculiar logical formula that can be found in 
several texts belonging to the Zen literary tradition, concerning specifically 
the concept of contradiction.  
 
Zen and the Logic of Nothingness 
 
Zen has been widely described, within and outside the context of 
academia, as a “cult of the absurd,” by detractors, and even by zealous 
disciples.31 For instance, Suzuki evoked Tertullian’s paradox (credo quia 
absurdum) in order to explain Zen’s faith in irrationality. Actually, the view of 
Zen as an anti-rational and anti-intellectual tradition has been challenged.32 
                                                 
31 Arthur Koestler, “A Stink of Zen: The Lotus and the Robot II” in Encounter 85 (1960), 
13-32. 
32 Daisetsu Teitaro Suzuki, Comparative Religion, ed. by Jeff Wilson and Tomoe Moriya, 
vol. 3 of Selected Works of D.T. Suzuki (Berkeley: University of California Press), 123. 
Zen has often been described as a chiefly anti-intellectualist tradition. Nonetheless, this 
is only partially true: recent studies explored Zen insistence on the intuitive and “sudden” 
character of the true understanding and the alleged rejection of pedagogical mediations, 
identifying this emphasis as the result of a rhetorical strategy and not as the reflection of an actual 
praxis. See Bernard Faure, The Rhetoric of Immediacy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991) 
and Youru Wang, Linguistic Strategies in Daoist Zhuangzi and Chan Buddhism (New York: 
Routledge, 2003). 
In addition, although Zen is supposed to be a “special transmission outside the 
scriptures” (jiaowai biechuan 教外別傳), several studies proved that Mahayana teachings, 
doctrines and sutras were greatly influential in Chan, since its early origins. See Albert Low, Zen 
and the Sutras (Boston: Turtle Publishing 2000). 
Several schools and lineages emphasized, in relation to the idea of a “special 
transmission outside the scriptures”, the complementary principle of “harmony between Chan 
and the teachings” (jiaochan yizhi 教禪一致). See Albert Welter “Mahakasyapa’s Smile: Silent 
Transmission and the Kung-an (Koan) Tradition,” in The Koan: Texts and Contexts in Zen 
Buddhism, ed. by Steven Heine and Dale S. Wright (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2000). 
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Among the most popular epitomes of Zen as mask of the absurd and of the 
incomprehensible, there is certainly the saying of Qingyuan Weixin 青原惟信
, master who lived in the 9th century: 
 
Before I had studied Zen for thirty years, I saw 
mountains as mountains, and rivers as rivers. When I 
arrived at a more intimate knowledge, I came to the 
point where I saw that mountains are not mountains, 
and rivers are not rivers. But now that I have got its very 
substance I am at rest. For it is just that I see mountains 
once again as mountains, and rivers once again as 
rivers.33 
 
A similar pattern repeatedly occurs in the Diamond Sutra: 
 
Subhuti, that which is called the Buddha Dharma is not 
the Buddha Dharma; therefore it is called the Buddha 
Dharma.34 
 
The Buddha teaches that prajna paramita [perfection of 
wisdom] is not prajna paramita. Therefore it is called 
prajna paramita.35 
 
To the extent that these worlds really exist, they do so as 
a composite. The Tathagata teaches that composites are 
not composites. Therefore they are called composites.36 
 
In order to explain the peculiar logic that underlies these sayings, I 
need to say something more about the pedagogic process inherent to the Zen 
experience, necessarily transmitted from masters to disciples, “mind-to-
mind” (以心伝心 ishin denshin). 
Until now, I illustrated the Buddhist view of the world as based on 
the notion of impermanence, selflessness and arising co-dependence. What I 
omitted to explain in detail is that the transitory, empty character of reality 
provokes a persistent state of unsatisfactoriness, suffering or anxiety (dukkha). 
This happens because the mind is naturally predisposed to “essentialize” 
perceptions and thoughts, and merge them in a coherent view. These 
accumulations of perceptions and thoughts, grasped by the senses, and 
                                                 
33 Alan Watts, The Way of Zen (New York: Pantheon Books, 1951), 26. 
34 Diamond Sutra, 8. 
35 Ibid, 13. 
36 Ibid, 30. 
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sedimented by the action of consciousness and memory, create the illusion of 
countless external substances opposing a singular internal substance, the ego, 
thus developing multiple (noxious) attachments. The accomplished 
sedimentation of senses-thoughts within the achieved construction of a self 
thus generates a state of dukkha, and prevents the opportunity of seeing things 
as they are.  
Within this theoretical framework, the use of language does not only 
reveal the presence of mental hindrances, but also actively contributes in the 
generation of further obstacles: 
 
Word-discrimination goes on by the coordination of 
brain, chest, nose, throat, palate, lips, tongue, teeth and 
lips. Words are neither different nor not-different from 
discrimination. Words rise from discrimination as their 
cause; if words were different from discrimination they 
could not have discrimination for their cause; then again, 
if words are not different, they could not carry and 
express meaning. Words, therefore, are produced by 
causation and are mutually conditioning and shifting 
and, just like things, are subject to birth and 
destruction.37 
 
In Zen, non-verbal teachings are often preferred, since an imprudent 
use of language may generate additional illusions instead of dissolving the 
former ones. In this sense, Zen’s approach is analogous to Wittgenstein’s 
claim that philosophical problems must be dissolved rather than solved, since 
they spontaneously arise within the ordinary functioning of language – and, 
in the case of Zen, within the ordinary functioning of the whole system of 
mind, language, senses, and consciousness. 
Indeed, the target of Zen is not merely the language. Instead, it is 
necessary to destabilize the discriminating action of consciousness. The 
primary task of the Zen master is to bring the disciple back to a pre-logical 
and pre-conceptual dimension of consciousness, emptying the mind from 
noxious obstructions.  
The final result of this process is the experience of the state of no-mind (無心 
mushin), characterized by no-thinking (無念 munen), which is not to be 
intended as a state of torpidity or inertness, but contrarily, as a psychological 
state “in which the mind finds itself at the highest point of tension, a state in 
which the mind works with utmost intensity and lucidity”, and reality is 
                                                 
37 Lankavatara Sutra, in A Buddhist Bible, ed. by Dwight Goddard (Boston: Beacon Press, 
1996), 2. 
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finally seized in the fullest density of existence, in its non-discriminated 
“suchness” (真如 shinnyo).38 
 
Good friends, what is negated by the “non” (無 mu)? 
What kind of thing is “thought” (念 nen)? “Non” means 
to be without the characteristic of duality, to be without 
the mind of the enervating defilements. “Thought” is to 
think of the fundamental nature of suchness.39 
 
Nonetheless, Zen does not advocate for a complete retirement from 
the “ordinary” world and a complete rejection of the ordinary state of 
consciousness, of the ordinary use of language, of the appeal to ordinary 
rationality, of the ordinary functioning of the mind. On the contrary, Zen 
advocates for the mastery of both these existential dimensions, the 
“conventional” and the “ultimate” realm.40 Several mondō (Zen dialogues) 
and koan narratives are structured upon the ideal interplay between 
conventional and ultimate truths.  
A remarkable difficulty in interpreting Zen scripts and sayings is due 
to their intrinsically perspectival standpoint. As was previously mentioned, 
according to Buddhism, even if the ultimate nature of the world consists in a 
state of dynamic non-determined nothingness, the same idea of nothingness 
must not become the object of a conceptual or emotional attachment.41  
In other words, a Zen practitioner should always be able to grasp reality in 
its totalizing contradictoriness and never dwell either in the realm of ultimate 
existence or in the complementary realm of conventional existence. 
Whenever this happens, the Zen master reacts by preaching the 
complementary pole of any antithesis generated by the spontaneous action of 
the discriminating mind: 
 
Because we maintain our minds of impermanence, 
The Buddha preached of permanence.42 
 
After having clarified these notions, we are finally able to understand 
the statement of Qingyuan Weixin and the logic of the Diamond Sutra, without 
the necessity of dismissing them as absurd or nonsensical.  
                                                 
38 Toshihiko Izutsu, Toward a Philosophy of Zen Buddhism (Boston: Shambhala, 1982), 14. 
39 Huineng, The Platform Sutra of the Sixth Patriarch, trans. by John McRae (Berkeley: 
Numata Center for Buddhist Translation and Research, 2000), 353ab. 
40 This idea is not an original product of Zen, it was already advanced in the Pali 
Canon, for instance in the Anguttara Nikaya, and in the Madhyamaka School. 
41 Huineng, The Platform Sutra of the Sixth Patriarch, 359b. 
42 Ibid., 350a. 
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The logical principle underlying these texts can thus be expressed by the 
formula: A is not A, therefore it is A. 
The first “A” refers to phenomena as they are perceived according to 
the ordinary state of consciousness, i.e. a state of mind in which things, 
including the ego, are seen as independently existent since provided with a 
specific irreducible identity. 
This step is immediately negated by the following, “is not A”. Within 
the Buddhist perspective, every aggregate relies on multiple causes and 
maintains multiple relationships with a wide spectrum of other processes. 43 
Due to these reasons, a single aggregate could be ideally isolated in 
conventional terms (in the domain of the Buddhist “conventional truth”), but 
never in theoretical or doctrinal terms (in the domain of the complementary 
“ultimate truth”).  
For instance, the simple consideration of a blade of grass would 
necessarily imply references to the soil in which it is planted, to the air, to 
water, to the atmosphere, and each of these elements would bring further 
connections and relationships, to such an extent that it would not be possible 
to graze a single blade of grass without influencing, at the same time, the 
entire universe.  
Nothing, according to Buddhism, is independently existent, and 
therefore it would be utterly nonsensical to define anything without 
considering the infinite set of co-dependent relationships connecting every 
single part to the whole. Furthermore, any conditioned dharma has to be 
regarded as a lightning flash or a dewdrop.  
Therefore, since any aggregate is immersed in the flux of time, it lacks 
an intrinsic essence that would allow a permanent identification and, 
consequently, a positive definition.  
For these reasons, the LID does not apply in the Buddhist 
perspective. Even positing only “A” would be, in principle, unacceptable, 
since there is nothing identical to itself: firstly, because there is nothing at all, 
being any apparent entity is merely the result of a countless number of 
processual interactions; secondly, because the flowing of time frustrates any 
attempt at determining or attributing a stable identity to any conceivable A.  
From this standpoint, it is not even contradictory to equate any term to its 
negation, nor to reaffirm the negated term right after its denial. If there is no 
identity, there is also no difference, since only something provided with a 
specific identity can be different from something else. Where there is no 
difference, there cannot be any contradiction. Thus, this view does not offer 
any ground for endorsing even the LNC and, evidently, the LEM. 
                                                 
43 Any physical aggregate, i.e., any “object” or “entity” in a Western philosophical 
vocabulary. 
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Despite that, the formula “A is not A”, as “mountains are not 
mountains” or “rivers are not rivers,” can be easily explained given a basic 
account of Zen view of the world: phenomena which appears to be existing 
as self-sufficient entities are actually devoid of inherent existence and not 
isolable as such. The proposition “A is not A” opposes then the conventional 
truth, i.e. the ordinary state of consciousness in which a permanent self-
identical ego is ideally counter-posed to a realm populated by likewise 
permanent self-identical entities, to the ultimate truth, i.e. a state of 
consciousness in which reality and the manifold aggregates are perceived as 
non-determined nothingness. 
Nonetheless, although “A is not A,” it is reaffirmed that “therefore it 
is A”. In fact, ultimate and conventional truth, ordinary and not-ordinary 
states of consciousness are not mutually exclusive, but complementary. Once 
acknowledged, the significant difference between conventional and ultimate 
truth must be overcome. If one remains attached either to the ordinary world 
or “to emptiness” his experience of Zen will be defective or faulty, 
contaminated by a noxious form of one-sidedness. Zen does not advocate an 
escape from reality, but rather for a more complete and totalizing experience 
of it.  
Therefore, the reaffirmation of “therefore it is A” also reaffirms the 
necessity to live, to reason and to communicate through the language, despite 
its inherent impossibility to construct meaningful descriptions of the world – 
at least, in respect to the ultimate truth, which is by definition ungraspable 
and undefinable. 
Finally, at the beginning “seeing mountains as mountains and rivers 
as rivers” means the common, ordinary understanding of reality. Then, 
“seeing mountains as not mountains and rivers as not rivers” means to have 
grasped the processual nothingness behind all phenomena. Lastly, “seeing 
again mountains as mountains and rivers as rivers” means to have subsumed 
the contradictoriness of reality44 in a state of consciousness able to embrace 
and transcend all conceivable contradictions. 
It is now clear how the Zen standpoint (consisting actually in a differential 
abandonment of all standpoints) cannot be considered as merely illogical or 
absurd. Rather, it stands outside of a particular logic, namely the logic of 
identity, and contradiction that underlay the historical development of the 
Western philosophical discourse.  
Zen’s own logic transcends the dichotomous construction of dualistic 
couples of identities and contradictions, and is clearly represented by the 
                                                 
44 To claim that things themselves are inherently contradictory is not only a rather odd 
affirmation, but also a completely misleading one according to the Buddhist perspective. 
Obviously, the contradiction must lie, or rather it must have been produced, within the ongoing 
relationship between things and the mind.  
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(apparently) paradoxical formula “A is not A, therefore it is A.” Following 
Nishida Kitarō, this principle could be given the denomination of Self-
Identity of Contradiction (SIC).45 
 
Conclusion  
 
To begin with, I illustrated the fundamental principles of the Western 
classical logic, which have been implicitly accepted throughout the history of 
Western philosophy and formal ontology. Subsequently, I criticized the 
characterization of Zen as an epitome of the absurd, a persistent platitude that 
has been repeated even by Zen scholars in order to stress an antithetic and 
irreconcilable opposition between the Western and the East Asian 
philosophical traditions.  
After having described the fundamental assumptions of Buddhism 
and a number of important notions pertinent to Zen theory and praxis, I 
analyzed and explained a peculiar formula that appears to be recurrent in 
several Zen literary sources, from ancient sutras to modern treatises.  
I hope in this way to have demonstrated that, although violating the 
principles of Western classical logic ultimately based on the mutually 
dependent notions of identity and contradiction, the logic of the “self-identity 
of contradiction” cannot be criticized (or praised) for being absurd or illogical. 
 
Department of Philosophy, University College Cork, Ireland 
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